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Upstream Release Integrity

Overview

These rules ask what the upstream this recipe trusts is actually shipping. Temporal already reports that an update arrived; this page asks what arrived.

The split is enforced by what TrustSight is allowed to read. Upstream Manifests reads the declared repository tree. Here, the build automation of a foreign repository is exactly what A2 forbids a local read of, so U007 and U008 do not fetch: they are indicator rules, matched against a publisher's signed upstream_repo set over IOC Federation. U009 is the one local surface, a weight-0 ledger entry for a workflow committed beside the recipe, and U010 is a local read of the source=() array for transports the public cannot inspect.

A federation miss is uninformative and never lowers a score. An upstream_repo match carries no points and is alerted at maximum priority, the same as any other indicator; see Indicator.

See Rule Mechanics for the field table, the severity weights and the reserved identifier ranges.


Threat context

A recipe names the upstream it trusts: a url=, a set of source=() entries, sometimes a validpgpkeys=. That declaration is a promise about code the reviewer usually cannot see. The upstream-release family is the reading of that promise at the border.

Two of its rules look at build automation. The workflow lives in the upstream repository, and A2 forbids a local analyser from fetching it, so a scanner with legitimate access publishes a signed upstream_repo shape over the federation channel. U007 and U008 consume that shape; they never read the workflow themselves. When the channel is cold, a miss is reported as a boundary rather than as absence of malice.

The other two read only the recipe the diff already carries. U009 notes a workflow committed beside the package, and U010 reads the access mode of a source the diff gained: SSH, file://, a private-network literal, or an embedded credential.

The same signed channel carries upstream_hash: an exact url|version|checksum triple a scanner observed at the vendor. C001 reads it to corroborate a checksum change the local source cannot explain: a match reports the change at weight 0, a miss leaves the HIGH weight alone.

The spec's flagship, a release re-tagged under an unchanged URL and version, is already C001 Checksum Changed Without Source Change. This family does not file it twice. On the 8,393-diff benign corpus C001 fires on 5 (0.13%), the false-positive floor the re-tag reading carries against ordinary package churn.

Detection mechanisms

The rules that make up this category are listed below, each with the series that implements it and the severity it carries. Scoring, matching and identifier allocation are shared across every category: see Rule Mechanics.

Individual rules

Rule Name Severity
U007 CI Exfil Shape MEDIUM
U008 Git-History Credential Sweep MEDIUM
U009 New CI Surface Committed LOW
U010 Unauditable Upstream MEDIUM
U013 CI Exfil Shape (Local) MEDIUM
U014 Git-History Credential Sweep (Local) MEDIUM

U007: CI Exfil Shape

  • Target: declared upstream repository (federation-fed)
  • Severity: MEDIUM
  • Category: upstream-ci

  • Condition: A signed federation finding reports that the repository this recipe declares as its upstream (url=) gained a workflow matching the GhostAction exfil shape: a ${{ secrets. reference paired with an outbound transfer to an IP literal or an unknown host.

The workflow content lives upstream, where A2 forbids a local read, so the shape arrives over the signed upstream_repo federation channel and is never fetched. A pkgver bump in the same diff is reported as context - the update is about to distribute whatever the upstream now builds - but is not required. A miss is uninformative, as with every indicator.

U008: Git-History Credential Sweep

  • Target: declared upstream repository (federation-fed)
  • Severity: MEDIUM
  • Category: upstream-ci

  • Condition: The same federation channel, the history-sweep shape: a workflow that materializes full history (fetch-depth: 0) and greps the commit history for credential patterns.

Independent of U007's exfil clause, so a repo reported for one shape does not imply the other. The workflow content is upstream and unreadable locally (A2); the signed upstream_repo entry is the only source.

U009: New CI Surface Committed

  • Target: committed .github/workflows/* files
  • Severity: LOW (weight 0)
  • Category: upstream-ci

  • Condition: The diff adds a file under .github/workflows/ (*.yml or *.yaml) to the package repository.

A new automation surface in the AUR repository. Rare (most AUR repositories carry no CI), so it is emitted as ci_surface_gained at weight 0 and never scored: it is a corroboration feed for U007/U008 and for IOC hits, not a claim on its own. AUR repositories are not where a package builds, but a workflow committed beside the recipe is a surface worth naming.

U010: Unauditable Upstream

  • Target: declared source=() transport and access mode
  • Severity: MEDIUM
  • Category: source

  • Condition: A gained source=() entry the public cannot inspect, in one of these shapes: embedded credentials in the authority (scheme://user:token@host/...); a private access transport (git+ssh://, ssh://, scp-style git@host:path); a private-network or local literal (localhost, RFC 1918, loopback, file://).

A malicious package wants payload nobody checks, and an authenticated or private-network upstream guarantees exactly that for every reviewer who is not the maintainer. Legitimate intranet and corporate AUR packages exist, which is why the verdict is a review-queue entry and the severity sits at MEDIUM.

A credential-bearing public web URL is C020's finding, and a public IP-literal host is C023's; U010 stands down on both and keeps the transports they cannot see. When the recipe also carries no validpgpkeys, the finding calls that out explicitly: no third party can see the source and no signature vouches for it. This is corroborating evidence, not a score change.

Measured on the v1 benign corpus, U010 fires on none: the transports it reads are deliberate choices, not background churn.

U013: CI Exfil Shape (Local)

  • Target: fetched upstream workflow
  • Severity: MEDIUM (weight 0)
  • Category: upstream-ci

  • Condition: A fetched upstream workflow (.github/workflows/*) that references a repository secret (${{ secrets.) and sends it to an IP literal or to a host outside the small known-egress set.

This is the local counterpart of U007. It runs only when the operator enabled [upstream_scan], the declared archive's checksum verified, and the workflow was read from that archive. It is anergic (weight 0) until the corpus calibrates it, so it is a report-only signal rather than a scored claim.

U014: Git-History Credential Sweep (Local)

  • Target: fetched upstream workflow
  • Severity: MEDIUM (weight 0)
  • Category: upstream-ci

  • Condition: A fetched upstream workflow that checks out full history (fetch-depth: 0) and greps that history for credential-shaped patterns.

This is the local counterpart of U008. It runs only on a workflow read by the opt-in [upstream_scan] lane and is anergic (weight 0) until calibrated.

Interpretation

  • A U007/U008 finding attributes an upstream repository to a published, signed shape. It is evidence from the federation channel, not a local fetch, and it never lowers a score.
  • U009 is a weight-0 ledger entry: a new automation surface in the package repository is worth noting, not scoring. It corroborates U007/U008 or an IOC hit when they co-occur.
  • U010 says the public cannot inspect a declared source. Without validpgpkeys the finding is amplified: nobody can see the source and no signature vouches for it. Corporate intranet packages legitimately look like this, which is why it is a review-queue signal and not a verdict.
  • None of these rules reads upstream content. A finding is about a declaration or a signed observation, never about the cargo inside the box.